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INTRODUCTION

When Israel ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in 1991,' it entered a declaration regarding the Covenant's provision that prohibits arbitrary detention and arrest. Article 9 of the Covenant
gives any person a right to be informed upon arrest of the reasons for the
arrest and to be notified promptly of the charges. It also guarantees the
arrested person a right to be brought promptly before a judicial official
and to be tried within a reasonable time.2 Invoking the Covenant's article

* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. Harvard Law School, LL.B. (1966); Harvard
University, M.A. (1966); Harvard College, A.B. (1962).
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Covenant].

2. Specifically, article 9 provides:
1.

Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his

liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law.

2.
3.

Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons
for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power
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on derogation in time of "public emergency," 3 Israel declared that it has
been in a continuous state of emergency since its founding in 1948 and,
therefore, it does not consider itself bound to comply strictly with article 9
of the Covenant.
The consequence of Israel's declaration is that it may detain persons
for indefinite periods of time without informing them of the charge, block
detainee access to courts, and prevent detainees from challenging their
incarceration or forcing the government to give reasons for their detention
all without violating the Covenant.
This article analyzes the permissibility of such a derogation under the
Covenant and under general international law. Part I of this article outlines
the historical development of Israel's declaration of a continuous state of
emergency and its justification for detention without trial. Part II examines
international rules on detention and derogation. Part III establishes a
standard for declaring a state of emergency and applies this standard to
Israel's declaration, with respect both to Israel's own territory and to the
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel. Finally, Part IV inquires whether
Israel will apply the Covenant as a matter of domestic law.
I.

ISRAELI DETENTION PRACTICE AND THE
REASONS FOR THE DECLARATION

When it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in 1991, Israel made a formal declaration, communicated to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (the depository agency for the
Covenant) as follows:
Since its establishment, the State of Israel has been the victim of
continuous threats and attacks on its very existence as well as on the
life and property of its citizens.
These have taken the form of threats of war, of actual armed
attacks, and campaigns of terrorism resulting in the murder of and
injury to human beings.

4.

5.

and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall
not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody,
but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage
of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of
judgement.
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled
to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention
is not lawful.
Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.

Covenant, supra note 1, art. 9,999 U.N.T.S. at 175-76.
3. Id. art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
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In view of the above, the State of Emergency which was proclaimed in May 1948 has remained in force ever since. This situation
constitutes a public emergency within the meaning of article 4(1) of
the Covenant.
The Government of Israel has therefore found it necessary, in
accordance with the said article 4, to take measures to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, for the defence of
the State and for the protection of life and property, including the
exercise of powers of arrest and detention.
In so far as any of these measures are inconsistent with article 9
of the Covenant, Israel thereby derogares [sic] from its obligations
under that provision.
As recited in this declaration, Israel has considered itself to be in a continuous state of emergency since May 1948 when Israel's Provisional Council of State passed an ordinance that gave the Council power to declare a
state of emergency, and the Council immediately declared a state of
emergency.' The proposition that Israel has experienced conditions justifying the declaration of a state of emergency was not presented for the first
time in 1991. To the contrary, it is a position that the government of Israel
has maintained consistently since the country's founding.
On the basis of the state of emergency declared in 1948, Israel has
applied a set of extraordinary provisions, which were originally adopted for
Palestine by Great Britain when it held a mandate for the territory.6 These
provisions, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, permitted detention
without trial along with other measures derogating from normal protections,
such as deportation, curfew, and suppression of publications.7 Thus, Israel
has consistently asserted a need to incarcerate citizens in violation of the
standard covenant requirement of judicial proceedings.

4. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT
DEC. 31, I99i, at 149, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E1O, U.N. Sales No. E.92.IV.4 (1992)
[hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1991] (Israeli declaration of Oct. 3, 1991).
5. Law and Administration Ordinance, art. 9(a), 1 Laws of the State of Israel [Laws St.
Isr.] 7 (1948) (enacted May 19, 1948). Before the Knesset (Israel's parliament) was established, the Provisional Council of State held legislative authority. HENRY E. BAKER, THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 12-13 (1961).

6. Law and Administration Ordinance, art. 11, 1 Laws St. lsr. 7 (1948); see also Michael
Saltman, The Use of the Mandatory Emergency Laws by the Israeli Government, 10 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 385 (1982). On Knesset discussion of the Regulations in the early years of the Israeli
State, see DAPHNA SHARFMAN, LIVING WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION: CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL
45-50, 151-52 (1993).
7. For the text of the British provisions, see Defence (Emergency) Regulations, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE, No. 1442, Supp. No. 2, Sept. 27, 1945, at
1083-85. The Regulations were repealed by Britain before it withdrew from Palestine in 1948.
Palestine (Revocations) Order in Council, § 2, 2, Statutory Instrument No. 1004 (1948).
Nonetheless, Israel applied them starting in 1948 as if they had been part of the law in force

in Palestine when Israel commenced its existence.
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Detention without trial is, according to the Supreme Court of Israel,
aimed at averting future dangerous acts. rather than punishing past acts.8
Detention without trial allows authorities to detain a person they believe to
be dangerous without the need for amassing evidence sufficient to convince a court of the person's guilt. For authorities, it has the advantage of
allowing them to keep confidential the sources of information that led to
the suspicion of the particular person. It also allows the detention of
persons who have not committed a criminal offense.
Detention without trial under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
was practiced frequently in the .Arab-populated sectors of Israel, which
were under military rule until 1966. 9 After 1966, Knesset (parliament)
members proposed the abolition of this practice, but it remained in effect
until 1979 when Israel enacted the current administrative detention law.'0
Under the 1979 law, the Minister of Defence may order a person detained
if the Minister "has reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state
security or public security. require that a particular person be detained,""
but the courts may review the reasons given by the Minister. The standard
of review is that the judge "shall set aside the detention order if it has
been proved to him that the reasons for which [the order] was made were
not objective reasons of state security or public security or that it was
made in bad faith or from irrelevant considerations."' 2 The detained person
has the burden of proof for meeting this standard, but if the judge considers such procedures warranted by considerations of State or public security, the judge may hear incriminating evidence outside the presence of the
detainee or detainee's counsel. 3 The principal innovations of the 1979 law
were that it reduced the maximum period of confinement without charge
from one year to six months, and that it provided for limited judicial
review as outlined above. "
After Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, it enforced the Defence (Emergency) Regulations there, as well as in Israel

8. Kawasmeh v. Minister of Defence, 36(1) Piskei Din 666 (1982);

DAVID KRETZMER,

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 145 (1990).
9. See, e.'g., DAPHNA GOLAN, DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL: ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
25 (1992), SABRI
JIRYIS, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 14-15 (Inea Bushnaq trans., 1976). Detention was also used
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA

against dissident Jewish elements. Id.
10. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 33 Laws St. Isr. 89 (1979). For a discussion of
reasons behind the enactment of the new law and comments of Knesset members who
opposed administrative detention, see SHARFMAN, supra note 6, at 147-52.
11. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, art. 2(a), 33 Laws St. Isr. at 89.
12. Id. art. 4, 33 Laws St. Tsr. at 90.
13. Id. art. 6, 33 Laws St. Isr. at 90-91.
14. Id. art. 4, 33 Laws St. Isr. at 90.
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itself.'5 In 1980, the government amended the Regulations as applied in6
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to provide for limited judicial review.'
A detainee was to be brought before a military judge within ninety-six
hours. As under the 1979 law, the judge was to quash the detention if the
police did not issue the order for objective reasons of security. Additionally, the judge was to review the detention order every three months.17 The

detainee, however, had no right to be informed of the grounds for suspicion, which the government typically deemed classified intelligence
information.' Still, the detainee bore the burden of proving that the
reasons leading to the order "were not objective reasons of state security."
Appeal could be taken to the High Court of Israel.' 9
During the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that
began in December 1987, Israeli military authorities detained thousands of
individuals without trial under the administrative detention provisions.'
The widespread use of administrative detention during that period led the
Israeli government to ease the procedural requirements for its use. Under
prior provisions, the detention had to be authorized at the highest level of

government, but in 1988 the military administration authorized any
military officer above the rank of colonel to order detention. 2' This
procedure facilitated the use of detention as a tool to quell the Palestinian
J
uprising.
That same 198.8 amendment also revoked the 1979 procedures for
review by a military court.22 The purpose of the revocation was "to ease
the heavy burden on the military courts and the military prosecutor
resulting from the large number of administrative detention orders issued

15. See EMMA PLAYFAIR, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK
10-11 (1986) (citing art. 3 of Israeli Military Order 224 of 1968 as providing that the
Defence Regulations applied to the West Bank and Gaza, and discussing specific provisions
for administrative detention as found in arts. 84A and 87 of Military Order 378 of 1970); see
also id. at 39-51 (reciting extracts of Military Order 378, Order Concerning Security Regulations (1970)).
16. Id. at 11 (recounting important provisions of Military Order 815, Amendment to Art.
87 of Military Order 378 (1980)).
17. Id. (recounting Amendment to Art. 87 of Military Order 378, Arts. 87D, 87F (1980)
and Military Order 815, Jan. 11, 1980).
18. ISRAEL NATIONAL SECTION, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF
LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 73 (1981).
19. PLAYFAIR, supra note 15, at 19.
20. GOLAN, supra note 9, at 7 (stating that over 14,000 administrative detention orders
have been issued to Palestinians since the beginning of the uprising).
21. Dan Tageed, Chief of Staff Approved New Version for Order on Administrative
Detainees, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 20, 1988, at 7; see also AL-HAQ, ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 1989: A NATION UNDER SIEGE 296
(1990) (discussing Military Order 1229, its effect on review procedures, and its authorization
of lower-ranking Israeli military commanders to issue administrative detention orders).
22. Id.
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in the last three months as a result of the riots. 23 The amendment also
eliminated the provision requiring judicial review within ninety-six
hours. A detainee, however, was given the right to appeal to a newlyestablished Military Appeals Committee composed of a military judge
and two Israeli Defense Force officers.2 4 A later 1988 amendment substituted appeal to a single judge for appeal to a three-judge panel.25
Amnesty International has criticized the use of administrative detention in the occupied territories as violative of international standards. In
1989, Amnesty International published a report charging that Israel used
administrative detention to suppress dissent, to substitute for the criminal
justice system, and to avoid its safeguards. 26 "Detainees," states Amnesty International, "are not allowed to challenge their accusers and challenge the veracity of their allegations .... They are usually not even
informed of the details of such allegations. 27 Amnesty International said
that these procedures did not conform to provisions in the Covenant on
the right of a detainee to judicial review of the detention.28
II. INTERNATIONAL RULES
The Human Rights Committee, which was established by the
Covenant to monitor compliance with the Covenant's norms by State
Parties, has developed a body of case law under the Covenant. 29 The
Committee adjudicates complaints made by persons alleging that a State
Party violated Covenant rights. 30 From time to time, the Committee,
issues a general comment on the meaning of a Covenant article. Additionally, the Committee receives periodic reports from all State Parties

23. Id. (translated by author).
24. Glenn Frankel, Israeli Army Allows Press Inspection of Detention Center for
Palestinians, WASH. POST, June 3, 1988, at A21; see also AL-HAQ & WEST BANK AFFILIATE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, ANSAR 3: A CASE FOR CLOSURE 31

(1988)

(outlining the appeals process and noting that the three-judge panel has been reduced to one
judge).
25. AL-HAQ, supra note 21, at 296 (discussing Military Order 1236, Amendment to
Procedure for Administrative Detention Orders (1988)).
26. David Horovitz, Amnesty Blasts Use of Administrative Detention - Callsfor Specified Releases, JERUSALEM POST, June 1, 1989, at 12.
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 28, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
30. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302-46. The International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights is a treaty separate from the Covenant; if a State Party to the
Covenant becomes, in addition, a party to the Optional Protocol, then an individual may file
a complaint with the Committee against that State. Sixty-five States are parties to the Optional
Protocol.
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to the Covenant concerning their compliance.3 ' The Committee then
questions these States about their practices and in so doing contributes
to the elaboration of the Covenant's norms. Through these various
procedures, the Committee has explicated the meaning of article 9 and
has set definite limits on the right of States under article 4 to derogate
from their Covenant obligations.
A. InternationalRules on Detention
Although international standards do not wholly prohibit the practice
of detention without charge, they seriously limit its use. The Human
Rights Committee has found detention to be arbitrary under the Covenant in the cases of: an arrest without a judicial warrant; 32 a kidnapping
abroad with forced return to the national territory; 33 a detention of a
34
person not charged with a crime but from whom information is sought;
a continued detention after completion of a sentence; 35 and a continued
detention after a judicially-ordered release.36
A detention is arbitrary if it violates the laws of detention in force in
the relevant territory or if, even though in conformity with territorial
laws, the State detains individuals in a manner that violates a person's
right to liberty and security. Under the latter rubric, a detention would
be arbitrary if a person, although detained legally under the law in force,
is detained for acts that are internationally protected, such as the expression of political opinion.37
The Israeli provisions on administrative detention fall short of article
9 Covenant requirements 38 because they do not require prompt

31. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181.
32. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
196, 202, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985) (regarding Comm. No. 139/1983 submitted by Conteris
concerning Uruguay).
33. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
185, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (regarding Comm. No. 13/56 submitted by Celiberti de

Casariego concerning Uruguay).
34. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
134, 140, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (regarding Comm. No. 16/1977 submitted by Mbenge
concerning Zaire).
35. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at

111, 117, U.N. Doc. A/35/40 (1980) (regarding Comm. No. 2/8 submitted by Lanza de Netto
concerning Uruguay).
36. Id. at 121, 126.
37. See Reed Brody, The United Nations Creates a Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 709, 713 (1991). On general requirements for detentions, see
generally Study of the Right of Everyone To Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and
Exile, U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/826/Rev.1 (1964).

38. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 9(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
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notification to the detainee of the reasons for the detention. Detainees
have no right to be informed of the reasons for a detention,39 and a
reviewing court may entertain evidence in the detainee's absence and
without disclosing it to the detainee.' The Human Rights Committee
has said that notification must be of sufficient specificity to enable the
detainee to avail herself or himself of remedies for release. 4' The Israeli
practice of nondisclosure makes it extremely difficult for a detainee to
avail himself or herself of remedies for release.
The Israeli provisions also violate the Covenant requirement that the
detained person have access to a court with the power to order release if
the detention is deemed unlawful.42 Although technically Israel provides
such access, the ability of the court to conceal the reasons for the detention effectively deprives the detainee of access to a proceeding where
the detainee can competently challenge the lawfulness of the detention.4 3
Finally, the Israeli provisions do not call for "an enforceable right to
compensation" for a person unlawfully detained as required by article
9. 44 The Israeli declaration of a continual state of emergency has the
effect of exempting Israel from fulfilling these article 9 requirements for
detention.
B. InternationalRules on Derogation
Given that Israel has sought to avoid the strictures of article 9 of the
Covenant through its declaration, the question then arises as to whether
it has properly derogated from the application of that provision. Derogation is provided for by article 4 of the Covenant, which states:

39. See generally Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 33 Laws St. lsr. at 89-92.
40. Id. art 6(c).
41. This communication states that art. 9(2):
requires that anyone who is arrested shall be informed sufficiently of the reasons
for his arrest to enable him to take immediate steps to secure his release if he
believes that the reasons given are invalid or unfounded. It is the view of the
Committee that it was not sufficient simply to inform Adolfo Drescher Caldas that
he was being arrested under the prompt security measures without any indication of
the substance of the complaint against him.
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 192, 195,
U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (regarding Comm. No. 43/1979 of Drescher Caldas v. Uruguay).
42. Id. at 196. Under a comparable provision, see infra note 56, guaranteeing the right to
prompt access to a judge under the European Human Rights Convention, the European Court
of Human Rights has said that detention for six days without production before a judge was
unlawful. Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 137
(judgment of May 26, 1993), reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 184, 186 (1993).
43. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, art. 6(c), 33 Laws St. Isr. at 91.
44. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 9(5), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
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In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States
Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from
their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin.45
Certain Covenant provisions are nonderogable, meaning that a State may
not elect to avoid their application by declaring an emergency. These
include the Covenant's provisions relating to the right to life, freedom
from torture, and protection against ex post facto laws. 46 Article 9, the
Covenant provision on detention, is not one of the nonderogable articles.
Thus, a State may avoid the application of article 9 by declaring a state
of emergency.
As article 4 makes clear, however, before a State can validly declare
an emergency, a serious situation must exist. Additionally, the State
must make a formal declaration of emergency, communicate it in writing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and justify the
declaration to the Human Rights Committee. 47 Thus, there are both
substantive and procedural requirements for the declaration of an emergency.
On the procedural side, a State must first communicate its declaration in writing to the other State Parties through the Secretary-General,
specifying the Covenant articles from which it is derogating and "the
reasons by which" the declaration "was actuated. 48 The SecretaryGeneral publishes the text of each declaration in Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary-General.Contrasted with treaty reservation
situations,49 there is no formal procedure whereby other State Parties
respond.
The Covenant also requires a State declaring an emergency to justify
the emergency with specificity to the Human Rights Committee. States
must make periodic reports to the Committee regarding their compliance

45. Id. art. 4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
46. Id. art. 4(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
47. Id. art. 4(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
48. Id.
49. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, arts. 19-23, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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with the Covenant;' if a State has declared an emergency, the Committee will independently assess whether there truly was an emergency and
whether, considering the purpose for which the emergency was declared,
the State needed each of the exceptional measures taken pursuant to the
declaration. The "emergency" must be a situation that makes it necessary for the State to violate specific Covenant norms in order to maintain minimum public order.
Although it is up to national authorities to declare an emergency, the
Human Rights Committee has made it clear that the decision must be
proper under the Covenant. 5' The Committee, in fulfillment of its monitoring role, has assumed for itself the competence to make an independent determination of whether a derogation measure was "strictly required. ' 52 The Committee says that, under article 4, the burden is on the
derogating State to show the existence of an emergency.53
Article 40 of the Covenant requires that States Parties submit an
initial report to the Human Rights Committee within one year of adhering to the Covenant and subsequent reports thereafter when the
Committee so requests, in order to chronicle their progress in achieving
the human rights standards set forth in the Covenant. When a State in its
article 40 report tries to justify an article 4 derogation, the Committee
asks probing questions to ascertain whether that article 4 derogation was
necessary.54 The Committee, however, has been unsuccessful in eliciting

50. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181-82 (requirement of periodic
reports).
51. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
55, U.N. Doc. A/34/40 (1979) (referring to "the duty of the Committee to ascertain whether
there was justification for each and every derogation" under art. 4).
52. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
130, 132, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (regarding Case No. 8/34 submitted by Landinelli Silva
concerning Uruguay).
53. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
168, 173, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (regarding Case No. 15/64 submitted by Salgar de
Martejo concerning Uruguay and stating that the State Party is "duty bound" to "give a
sufficiently detailed account of the relevant facts to show that a situation of the kind described in article 4(1) of the Covenant exists"); accord Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONv.
ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) 72 (stating that Greece had the burden to prove an emergency).
54. Report of the Human Rights Committe, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
58-66, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (questions to Uruguay). Report of the Human Rights
Committe, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 54-61, U.N. Doc. A/35140 (1980)
(questions to Colombia). Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, at 17-27, 55, U.N. Doc. A/34/40 (1979) (questions to Chile and the United
Kingdom); Jaap Walkate, The Human Rights Committee and Public Emergencies, 9 YALE J.
WORLD PUB. ORD. 133, 136-41 (1982) (summarizing Committee questioning of the United
Kingdom, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay).
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appropriate information from States concerning their reasons for invoking article 4.55

The European Court of Human Rights, which administers the European human rights treaty, has elaborated a jurisprudence on derogaThat treaty contains derogation provisions similar to those of the
tion. 56cotist
Covenant, 57 and thus its decisions on derogation have persuasive value
in interpreting the Covenant's article 4. Underneath the European Court
of Human Rights functions the European Commission on Human
Rights, which makes preliminary decisions under the European human
rights treaty.58 It too has dealt with derogation under the European
human rights treaty. The European Court of Human Rights has said that
a public emergency threatening the life of a nation means "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population
and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which
the State is composed." 59
The European Court found a valid emergency in Ireland during
1956-57 because of Irish Republican Army activities during a nine-month
period. 6° In a later case, the Court again found a validly declared emergency in Northern Ireland - again on the basis of military activities of
the Irish Republican Army. 6' However, the European Commission of
Human Rights found no valid emergency in Greece in 1967 where
ongoing military activities were absent.62
Filing declarations under article 4 of the Covenant gives States the
opportunity to recite factual circumstances, usually recent widespread

55. Joan F. Hartman, Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4
Derogation Provision, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 89, 123 (1985).

56. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, arts. 38-56, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 242-48.

57. Article 15 states:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under
this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,

provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law.

Id. art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
58. Id. arts. 20-37, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234-42.
59. Id. Lawless Case (Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON H.R. (Eur. Ct. H.R.) 438, 472,
474. The French text of the quoted language states more clearly that the situation must pose
imminent danger ("une situation de crise ou de danger exceptionnel et imminent"). See id. at
473, 475. The French text, not the English, was the authentic text.
60. Id. at 474.
61. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON H.R. (Eur. Ct. H.R.) 602, 608.
62. Greek Case, supra note 53, at 76, 100.
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civil unrest, which form the basis for declaring a state of emergency.
The declarations have typically (although not uniformly) specified a
time frame, such as thirty or sixty days, for the emergency period. Even
when a time period has not been specified, however, the State has
typically indicated that the period will be temporary.63 When the emergency ceases, the State files a new declaration to inform other State
Parties of the termination date.64
The time factor is important to an analysis of Israel's declaration,
because Israel claims in its declaration that it has been in an emergency
situation since 1948. Although article 4 specifies no maximum time
period, the concept of "public emergency" implies a temporary situation.6 ' The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogations Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(guidelines drafted by a group of human rights experts) specified that
"[t]he severity, duration, and geographic scope of any derogation measure shall be such only as are strictly necessary to deal with the threat to
66
the life of the nation and are proportionate to its nature and extent."
The Human Rights Committee has said that "measures taken under
article 4 are of an exceptional and temporary nature and may only last
as long as the life of the nation concerned is threatened .... "6 If emergency measures must be "temporary" and "exceptional," a State declaring a decades-long emergency would seem to face a nearly insurmountable standard of proof to show that such an emergency complies with
article 4.
A number of States have declared an emergency of a more or less
permanent type. Paraguay deemed itself to have been in a state of siege
from 1929 to the 1980s, with only one six-month interruption.68

63. See, e.g., Declaratioh of Bolivia, Oct. 1, 1985, referring to its having instituted "a
temporary state of siege." MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL STATUS AS AT DEC. 31, 1992, at 137, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/II, U.N. Sales No.

E.93.V.l 1 (1993).
64. Id. at 137 (recounting notification by Argentina of termination date of a state of
emergency).
65. JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30
(1992).
66. The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 3, 9 (1985).
67. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
110, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (general comment 5/13).
68. Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning
Situations Known as States of Siege or Emergency, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Provisional Agenda Item 10, at 28, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15 (1982).
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Cameroon had a declared emergency from 1969 to the 1980s 69 and
Haiti from 1971 to the 1980s. 70 Such long-term emergencies are questionable in terms of need; this is reflected in the Human Rights Committee consideration of a declared emergency in Chile. Committee
members questioned Chilean representatives about a state of emergency
that appeared to be indefinite in duration.7 1 Chile's state of emergency,
declared in 1973, was ongoing in 1979 even though Chile's state of
siege was no longer in force. The Committee criticized Chile for practicing detention without trial on the basis of its seemingly indefinite emergency.72
If a violation of the Covenant is alleged against a State, and if the
State relies on an emergency declared under article 4 as a defense, the
Human Rights Committee first assesses the validity of the declared
emergency. If it finds the emergency unwarranted and also finds the
State to have violated an article of the Covenant, it will find the State in
73
violation of the Covenant.
III. DETENTION DURING AN EMERGENCY
Derogation "can have serious implications for the treatment of
anyone held in preventive detention," writes analyst Helena Cook. 74 "It
is precisely at times of internal conflict and emergency that large numbers of people are likely to be arrested and detained.? 75 The risk of
physical abuse of detainees increases at such times. 6 The Human Rights
Committee has stated that detention without trial is permissible under a
valid emergency only if "the person concerned constitutes a clear and
serious threat to society which cannot be contained in any other man77
ner."

69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
19, 20, 23, U.N. Doc. A/34/40 (1979).

72. Id. at 19.
73. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
130, 133, U.N. Doe. A/36/40 (1981) (regarding Case No. 8/34 submitted by Landinelli Silva

concerning Uruguay).
74. Helena Cook, Preventive Detention - InternaiionalStandards and the Protection of
the Individual, in
PERSPECTIVE 1, 48

PREVENTIVE

DETENTION:

A

COMPARATIVE

AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Stanislaw Frankowski & Dinah Shelton eds., 1992).
75. Id. at 48-49.
76. Id. at 49.
77. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
117, 122, U.N. Doe. A/38/40 (1983) (regarding Comm. No. 66/1980 submitted by C.mpora
Schweizer concerning Uruguay).
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The Covenant allows derogation from the protection against arbitrary detention during a time of emergency.78 The rationale for allowing
derogation is that governments may require flexibility for incarcerating
persons in times of serious disorder, such as wartime situations, without
affording the detainees their normal rights. 79 However, the State must
limit derogation measures to those that are strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, meaning that even during an emergency a
State may not simply dispense with the need to provide ordinary trial
safeguards.8" Rather, a State must show in each instance of detention
without trial that there was a need to dispense with trial procedures.
The Committee has said that even when an individual is subjected to
detention without trial during a valid emergency, she or he is still entitled to certain protections of article 9, namely, the right to be brought
before a judge and the right to enter into proceedings to challenge the
detention. 81 The Committee's rationale is that even if the State is justified in incarcerating without proffering a criminal charge, the State must
allow the detainee access to the courts.82
As with the Covenant, the European treaty permits extraordinary
measures during a validly declared emergency only if those measures
are necessary. Thus, the existence of an emergency is not carte blanche
for arbitrary government action. For example, when an Irish detainee
challenged the fact that he had been detained during the 1956-57 emergency in Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights found his detention without trial to be justified by the circumstances of the emergency
only after it made specific factual findings to establish the nexus between the emergency and the need for the detention. It found that:
the application of the ordinary law had proved unable to check the
growing danger which threatened the Republic of Ireland; ... the
ordinary criminal courts, or even the special criminal courts or
military courts, could not suffice to restore peace and order; ...
the amassing of the necessary evidence to convict persons involved
in activities of the IRA and its splinter groups was meeting with
great difficulties caused by the military, secret and terrorist character of those groups and the fear they created among the population;

78.
79.
80.
81.

Covenant, supra note 1, art. 4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
Hartman, supra note 55, at 122.
Id.
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at

117, 123, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (regarding Comm. No. 66/1980 submitted by Cdmpora
Schweizer concerning Uruguay).
82. See ORAA, supra note 65, at 108-14 (noting other rights retained by a detainee
during a state of emergency).
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the fact that these groups operated mainly in Northern Ireland,

their activities in the Republic of Ireland being virtually limited to
the preparation of armed raids across the border was an additional
impediment to the gathering of sufficient evidence .... "
On the basis of these facts, the European Court said that administrative
detention was a measure required by the circumstances. 84 The European
Court reached that conclusion, however, only after finding that safeguards existed in the form of oversight by Parliament and the availability of appeal to a commission composed of a military officer and two
judges that had the power to release a detainee, and that the government
had stated its willingness to release any detainee prepared to state that
he would observe the law. 5 These findings insured that each detention
was warranted in the face of the available facts.
A. Sufficiency of Israel'sDeclaration
Although a State may have declared an emergency under certain circumstances making the declaration appropriate under domestic law, the
emergency is not necessarily valid under the Covenant. 86 Article 4 of the
Covenant requires that the claimed emergency threaten the "life of the
nation," which implies that the situation must be extremely serious
before article 4 can be invoked. 7
Typically, States declaring an emergency have provided scant factual information, and the Human Rights Committee has found several
declarations inadequate on that ground. For example, the Human Rights
Committee found Uruguay's 1979 declaration insufficiently specific.
Uruguay had stated only that
[t]his emergency situation, the nature and consequences of which
match the description given in article 4, namely that they threaten
the life of the nation, is a matter of universal knowledge, and the
present communication might thus appear superfluous in so far as
the provision of substantive information is concerned. 8
The Committee said that the lack of detail in this declaration "failed to
meet the formal requirements" of article 4.89

83. Lawless Case supra note 59, at 476.
84. Id. at 478.
85. Id.
86. ORAA, supra note 65, at 11.
87. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
88. MULTILATERAL TREATIES I99i, supra note 4, at 158 (Uruguay declaration of July
30, 1979).
89. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
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In a case brought against Uruguay alleging Covenant violations, in
which Uruguay relied on the declared emergency, the Human Rights
Committee found against Uruguay after determining that the facts recited in its declaration to the Secretary-General were insufficient, and
that it had subsequently failed to provide additional information. The
Committee reported that the Uruguayan declaration
confined itself to stating that the existence of the emergency situation was "a matter of universal knowledge"; no attempt was made
to indicate the nature and the scope of the derogations actually
resorted to with regard to the rights guaranteed by the Covenant, or
to show that such derogations were strictly necessary."l
Thus, the Committee established three items of information that must be
communicated under article 4: (1) a statement of the factual circumstances giving rise to the emergency; (2) a statement of the nature
and scope of the derogations to which the State is resorting; and (3) a
statement showing the necessity of these derogations. A valid declaration would first lay a factual base, then indicate acts the State plans to
take in violation of particular Covenant provisions, and finally, justify
the need for those acts.
Israel's declaration, to be valid, must meet this three-pronged test.
Regarding the first prong, Israel's declaration provides little detail,
stating only that:
Since its establishment, the State of Israel has been the victim of
continuous threats and attacks on its very existence as well as
on the life and property of its citizens.
These have taken the form of threats of war, of actual
armed attacks, and campaigns of terrorism resulting in the murder of and injury to human beings. 9'
On the basis of this factual description, Israel explained that it had
proclaimed a state of emergency in May 1948 that has "remained in
force ever since. 92

59, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982); see also Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
35th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 132, 136, U.N. Doc. A/35/40 (1980) (regarding Case No. 2/11
submitted by Grille Motta concerning Uruguay and stating that art. 4 "does not allow national

measures derogating from any of its provisions except in strictly defined circumstances, and
the Government has not made any submissions of fact or law to justify such derogation.").
90. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at

130, 132, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (regarding Case No. 8/34 submitted by Landinelli Silva
concerning Uruguay).
91.

MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1991, supra note 4, at 149-50 (Israeli declaration of Oct.

3, 1991).
92. Id. at 150. On the meaning of "proclaimed" under both the Covenant and the
European human rights convention, see Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur.
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Declarations typically are based on facts relating to a specific time
period, such as rioting in a particular province of a State. Israel's factual
statements, however, are general and relate to a broad time period,
making it difficult to determine precisely what events Israel intends to
include. The reference to "threats of war" over a period of more than
four decades without naming the authors of those threats seems inadequate to justify derogation under article 4. Similarly, the reference to
"actual armed attacks" without specifying dates or naming the authors
(presumably other States) is too general to satisfy article 4. The reference to "campaigns of terrorism" similarly lacks detail.
Many States of the world have been attacked by military forces and
have seen their citizens victimized by terrorism. These facts alone,
however, would not necessarily constitute a basis for declaring an
emergency absent more specific information about the frequency, intensity, and continuing nature of the attacks.
Regarding the nature and scope of the derogations and the necessity
for them, Israel's declaration does indicate a specific article - article 9.
After reciting the reasons for the emergency, the declaration states:
The Government of Israel has therefore found it necessary, in
accordance with the said article 4, to take measures to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, for the defence
of the State and for the protection of life and property, including
the exercise of powers of arrest and detention.
In so far as any of these measures are inconsistent with article
9 of the Covenant, Israel thereby derogates from its obligations
under that provision.93
Although it specifies the provision from which it is derogating,
Israel does not establish a nexus between the factual situation giving rise
to the emergency and the need to incarcerate persons in a manner which
violates -article 9. One is left to imagine that Israel desires the power to
incarcerate persons involved in the kinds of acts it adduces in its factual
recitation, and it does not want to be required to put these persons on
trial in the normal fashion. The declaration, however, should have made
that connection explicitly.
B. Israel's Continuing Emergency

The conclusory nature of the factual basis recited in Israel's declaration will require the Human Rights Committee to demand detail and to

Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
189 (1993).

68-73 (judgment of May 26, 1993), reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 184,

93. MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1991, supra

note

4,

at

149-50.
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probe the validity of the points Israel might make. The most serious of
the allegations made in Israel's declaration is that Israel has been the
victim of "continuous threats and attacks," and that these have taken the
form of "actual armed attacks." 94
"Armed attack" is the term used in the U.N. Charter to define
situations giving rise to a right of self-defense. 95 Thus, an "armed attack" is a use of military force in an unlawful fashion by one State
against another. Israel's declaration thus suggests that Israel has been the
victim of such unlawful force on a continuous basis since 1948.
The major military conflicts involving Israel occurred in 1948,96
1956, 9' 1967,98 1973, 99 and 1982."° Israel, however, does not even mention these wars in its declaration of derogation from article 9 of the
Covenant. Assuming that Israel's allegation of "continuous threats and
94. Id. (Israel declaration of Oct. 3, 1991).

95. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
96. In 1948, immediately after its declaration of statehood, Israel was confronted by
military forces of neighboring Arab States. U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 292d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.292 (1948) (statement of Mr. Eliash, Jewish Agency for Palestine, that neighboring
States were guilty of aggression for military actions); id. at 7-9 (statement of Mr. Nakhleh,
Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, that the putative government of Palestine after British
withdrawal had invited the Arab State forces into Palestine to protect law and order). The
U.N. Security Council, although calling for a ceasefire, made no finding of responsibility for
the initiation of hostilities. A.L.W. Munkman, Book Review, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
1968-69, at 306, 309 (1970) (reviewing Elihu Lauterpacht's book, Jerusalem, and the Holy
Places (1968)).
97. In 1956, Israel initiated a military invasion of Egypt in conjunction with France and
Great Britain, justifying its action as a response to guerrilla attacks into Israel from Egypt.
RITCHIE OVENDALE, THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

149-63 (1984).

98. In 1967, Israel launched another military invasion of Egypt. See

EDGAR O'BAL-

LANCE, THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 35 (1972); DAVID KIMCHE & DAN BAWLY, THE
SANDSTORM: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF JUNE 1967: PRELUDE AND AFTERMATH 134-56

(1968). Israel, however, told the U.N. Security Council that Egypt had attacked first. Com-

munication of the PermanentRepresentative of Israel to the Presidentof the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1347th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1347 (1967); U.N. SCOR, 22d

Sess., 1348th mtg. at 73-75, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1348 (1967) (statement of Mr. Eban, Israel).

When it was unable to produce evidence to back its claim of an Egyptian attack, Israel

conceded that its claim of an Egyptian attack had been false and instead asserted that it
invaded Egypt because Egypt was preparing to attack it. Admission on Attack, THE TIMES
(London), July 8, 1967, at 3 (quoting Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's statement that Israel had
acted in anticipatory self-defense and stating the Eshkol "buried the often-repeated statement
that Egyptian [air] and land forces attacked Israel before she launched her devastating
lightning offensive on June 5"). Israel's claim of an impending Egyptian attack was inconsistent with the assessment of its high military command, that Egypt was not about to attack
Israel, as reported to the cabinet just before the cabinet voted to invade Egypt. Eric Rouleau,

Le gdnirale Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait la guerre, LE
1.

MONDE,

Feb. 29, 1968, at

99. In 1973, Syria and Egypt attacked the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula,
respectively, for the apparent purpose of regaining this territory that Israel had occupied in

1967.

DONALD NEFF, WARRIORS AGAINST ISRAEL

137-51 (1988). Note, however, that

retaking sovereign territory by force is not considered aggression. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1963).
100. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. See MICHAEL JANSEN, THE BATTLE OF BEIRUT 8

(1982).
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attacks" refers to these five military conflicts, the allegations are insufficient to justify a continuing forty-five year derogation from article 9
protections.
Facts concerning these wars are disputed. °t Arguably, Israel was the
aggressor in all of these wars.102 Nonetheless, Israel fails to even recite
its own version of the facts in its declaration. Without a statement of the
factual circumstances giving rise to its declaration of an emergency, the
Human Rights Committee has no basis on which to determine the
necessity of derogations from article 9 and the extent to which derogations are necessary.
Gaps of six to eleven years separate each of the military conflicts in
which Israel has been involved. Most recently, nine years passed between the 1973 and 1982 wars and there have been no wars between
1982 and 1994. These significant periods of little military activity
demonstrate an insufficient factual basis for Israel's assertion that it has
been the victim of continuous armed attacks since 1948. Thus, on this
basis Israel's forty-five year derogation from article 9 of the Covenant is
unjustified.
Israel's declaration of an emergency also alleges "campaigns of
terrorism resulting in the murder of and injury to human beings."'' 0 3 This
assertion raises several issues. First, Israel has characterized as "terrorist" both those kinds of force that are internationally recognized as
terrorist, namely force directed against civilians and force used in a
military fashion against Israeli targets that are legitimate under the rules
of warfare."° For this reason, before Israel's assertion can be considered
for its validity, Israel must state specifically which category of force it is
characterizing in the wording of its declaration.
Furthermore, Israel's formulation does not make clear whether it
refers to actions stemming from persons inside its border, to actions
stemming from persons outside its border but directed into its territory,
or to actions undertaken abroad against Israeli citizens or institutions
with no intrusion into Israeli territory. These distinctions hold relevance

101. See JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE (1990), at
57-65 (1948 war), 156 (1956 war), 161-67 (1967 war), 195 (1973 war), 199-200 (1982 war).

102. Id.
103. MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1991, supra note 4, at 150.
104. George H. Aldrich, Prospectsfor United States Ratification of Additional Protocol
Ito the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 n.6 (noting that Israel did not sign
the Final Act of the conference that drafted Protocol I because Israel was displeased with the
Protocol provision that appeared to recognize the legitimacy of military action aimed at
achieving self-determination); John F. Murphy, Defining InternationalTerrorism: A Way Out
of the Quagmire, 19 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 13 (1989) (discussing the difficulty of arriving at
a generally accepted definition of terrorism).
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for an assessment of whether Israel has an "emergency," because attacks
not appear to
abroad with no direct impact on Israel's territory would
05
nation."'
the
of
life
the
"threatens
that
situation
a
create
Regarding cross-border raids, the U.N. Security Council, as noted,
has typically found Israel to be the party at fault, rather than those who
have attacked into Israel.' °6 Israel's assertion of armed attacks and
terrorism is not specific as to time. Instead, Israel asserts that these
activities have occurred from 1948 to the present. In light of international practice on derogation, this is a broad assertion. Typically, a State
declaring an emergency points to a series of recent events that it considers exceptional in comparison with the prior time period. Israel asserts,
however, that for forty-three years it has been in a situation of imminent
danger to the life of the nation. Even if Israel's factual assertions about
armed attack and terrorism could be substantiated for particular time
periods following 1948, this would not justify its assertion of a continuing emergency. Attacks into Israel affecting civilians have indeed occurred, but their frequency alone cannot give rise to a continuous state
of emergency. The 1991 declaration makes no reference to a shift in Israel's course of events during the late 1980s. Human Rights Committee
practice provides little basis for a justification so broadly framed.
The United Kingdom has also derogated from article 9 by declaring
an emergency based on terrorism. The U.K.'s 1988 declaration, subsequently renewed, exempts the United Kingdom from the article 9 requirement of promptly bringing a suspect before a judicial officer.' °7
The U.K.'s assertion of extra-Covenant powers, however, was modest,
as the United Kingdom claimed only the right to detain terrorist suspects
without judicial scrutiny for a period of seven days." 8 This declaration
followed a finding by the European Court of Human Rights that the
U.K. practice with terrorist suspects violated the right to prompt appearance before a judge - a right guaranteed by both the European human
rights treaty and the Covenant."9 The European Court of Human Rights
upheld the U.K.'s 1988 declaration, noting that the detention period was
limited to seven days and that additionally, during this period detainees

105. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
106. See S.C. Res. 119, U.N. SCOR, 11th Sess., 751st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3721 (1956),
reprinted in RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1956, at 8-9, U.N.
Doc. S/INF.ll/Rev. (1965).
107. MULTILATERAL TREATIES i991, supra note 4, at 158 (U.K. declarations of Dec. 23,
1988, Mar. 31, 1989, and Dec. 18, 1989).
108. Id. (declaration of Dec. 23, 1988).
109. Case of Brogan and others, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 37-40 (judgment of Nov. 29,
1988).
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could consult a lawyer after forty-eight hours of detention and could
institute habeas corpus proceedings to challenge the detention." 01
The fact that Israel from time to time experiences terrorist attacks,
staged from outside its border or from within, cannot justify its sweeping derogation from article 9. Such an extraordinary arrogation of power
to the government is not "strictly required" by the circumstances in
which Israel finds itself. Moreover, Israel's declaration, based on unspecified facts and extending across a broad time period, is difficult to
square with the requirements of article 4.
C. Application to the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Although not the only use, the most frequent use of administrative
detention by Israel has been in the territories it occupied in 1967 - particularly the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip. In these
territories, Israel has widely used administrative detention."' Thus,
Israel's derogation would have its most serious implications for Israel's
practice there. If the derogation is invalid, Israel would be obligated to
observe full article 9 rights with respect to detentions.
Israel takes the position that the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which it is a2
party, binds it with respect to its conduct in the occupied territories."
However, in a position expressed in 1984, after its signature but before
its ratification of the Covenant, Israel said that the Covenant would not
apply to its conduct in the Gaza Strip or West Bank because belligerent
occupation does not involve a normal relationship between citizen and
government. The Foreign Ministry's legal adviser explained,
The unique political circumstances, as well as the emotional realities present in the areas concerned, which came under Israeli administration during the armed conflict in 1967, render the situation
sui generis, and as such, clearly not a classical situation in which
the normal components of 'human rights law' may be applied, as
are applied in any standard, democratic system in the relationship
between the 'citizen' and his government. Hence the criteria

110. Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) [ 63-64
(judgment of May 26, 1993), reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 184, 189 (1993).
111. GOLAN, supra note 9, passim.
112. ADAM ROBERTS ET AL., ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER ISRAELI MILITARY OCCUPATION 80, 82-83 (1984) (reprinting Office of the Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
State of Israel, Memorandum (Sept. 12, 1984)) (noting that Israel had included the occupied
territories in its first report under the Convention to the Committee for the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination).
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applied in the areas administered by Israel, in view of the sui
generis situation, are those of 'humanitarian law', which balances
the needs of humanity with the requirements of international law to
administer the area whilst maintaining public order, safety, and
security." 3
Even if the Covenant were not applicable in the occupied territories,
Israel would still be required, as this memorandum acknowledges, to
apply "humanitarian law." Humanitarian law is the law that has developed in the international community specifically to regulate wartime
situations, including belligerent occupation. The same would be true if
the Human Rights Committee determined that the Covenant applied in
the occupied territories but that the emergency was valid and therefore
article 9 did not apply. Article 4 states that the declaration of an emergency does not free a State of its "other obligations under international
law." ' 4 Thus, even if an emergency were found to be validly declared,
Israel's obligations under humanitarian law would remain.
Israel has made an additional argument for the nonapplicability of
human rights treaties in the occupied territories. The Israeli foreign
ministry has said that the Torture Convention, which requires a State
Party to prevent torture "in any territory under its jurisdiction," is not
applicable in the occupied territories, because its application would
contradict Israel's view that the status of the territories remains to be
determined. Israel's rationale was that if it applied the Torture Convention in the territories, it would be making a claim to sovereignty in
those territories."15
In a related context, however, the International Court of Justice has
indicated that treaties protecting the rights of inhabitants should be
applied even when the administering State has no legitimate claim of
title over the territory. In its advisory opinion on Namibia," 6 the International Court found that South Africa's claim to and continued control

113. Id. at 81.
114. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. See also Lawless Case

supra note 59, at 480-82 (Court insisting on the requirement that Ireland may not avoid any
obligations it may otherwise have under international law by declaring an emergency).
115. Israeli Interrogation Methods under Fire after Death of Detained Palestinian, 4
MIDDLE

E.

WATCH

REP. 3 (Mar. 19, 1992) (quoting letter from Legal Adviser to Foreign

Ministry, forwarded by Foreign Ministry to Middle East Watch).

116. International Court advisory opinions are issued at the request of U.N. organs to
guide them in their work. U.N. CHARTER art. 96. They enjoy persuasive value in other
tribunals that apply international law. See, e.g., McComish v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 580 F.2d 1323, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing a 1950 I.C.J. advisory opinion on
Namibia (South West Africa)).
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over Namibia were unlawful." 7 It called on States not to apply to
Namibia any treaties they had with South Africa, in order to demonstrate that the States did not recognize South Africa's claim to
Namibia."' The International Court, however, also said that this prohibition would not apply "to certain general conventions such as those of a
of which may adversely
humanitarian character, the nonperformance
'' 9
affect the people of Namibia."
Thus, the International Court contemplated that States would insist
on South Africa's compliance with treaties protecting the rights of the
Namibian population, even though, in the International Court's view,
South Africa had no legitimate claim to sovereignty in Namibia. The
International Court thus disassociated the application of such treaties
from the question of sovereignty. The rationale of its ruling is that the
application of such treaties does not imply sovereignty over the territory
in question by the State that administers it.
Israel's position that the Covenant does not cover its occupation of
the Gaza Strip or West Bank is open to question. In fact, the general
view in the international community is that human rights law applies to
Israel's occupation. The U.S. Department of State, in its annual reports
on human rights in the occupied territories, assesses Israel's conduct
under the same human rights standards it uses 0to assess the human
rights record of States within their own territory.12
At the United Nations, the Secretary-General has stated that the
U.N. Charter provisions on human rights apply in wartime:
[T]he human rights provisions of the Charter make no distinction
in regard to their application as between times of peace on the one
hand and times of war on the other. . . . The phraseology of the
Charter would ... encompass persons living under the jurisdiction

and persons living in territories
of their own national authorities
21
occupation.'
belligerent
under

117. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 15, 54 (June 21).

118. Id. at 55 (stating that "Member States are under obligation to abstain from entering
into treaty relations with South Africa in all cases in which the Government of South Africa
purports to act on behalf of or concerning Namibia.").
119. Id.

120. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2d SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1979,
at 760-68 (1980) (submitted by U.S. Dept. of State).
121. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
GAOR, 24th Sess., Agenda Item 61, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969) [hereinafter SecretaryGeneral Report 1969].
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The Secretary-General also said that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applied during wartime."2 Furthermore, the U.N. General
Assembly affirmed this in a nearly unanimous resolution on the applicability of human rights law to armed conflict: "Fundamental human
rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in international
23
instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict."'
The Assembly referred to human rights law when it established a
committee to monitor rights observance in territories occupied by Israel
in 1967, stating that it was "inspired" in setting up the committee by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 4 In a resolution calling on
Israel to accept recommendations made by the monitoring committee,
its obligations under . . . the
the Assembly asked Israel "to comply with
' 25
Universal Declaration of Human Rights."'
The Human Rights Commission 26 of the United Nations, like the
General Assembly, has also referred to human rights law in this context.
It cited the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a
"guided" in assessing the situation in the Gaza
document by which it 2is
7
Strip and West Bank.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights indicates
that it applies in belligerent occupation with the fact that it provides, as
shown above, for the possibility of derogation in times of emergency,
which includes wartime. 28 Thus, the drafters assumed that, absent a
declared public emergency, the Covenant would apply in wartime situations.
The public emergency exception does not specifically mention
wartime or belligerent occupation. An early draft of this provision did
mention war, but the reference was deleted to avoid acknowledging the
possibility of war. As reported by the Secretary-General:

122. Id. at 12, 1 24 (noting, however, that an emergency consisting of a State involved in

armed conflict might justify a temporary limitation on some rights contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).

123. Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, G.A.
Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). The
resolution vote was 109-0-8.

124. G.A. Res. 2443, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1969) (preambular 1 1).
125. G.A. Res. 2727, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 36, 2, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971).
126. The Commission, not to be confused with the Human Rights Committee, supra

notes 29-31 and accompanying text, is a subsidiariy of the U.N. Economic and Social
Council and is the primary U.N. body responsible for human rights.

127. Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories,
Including Palestine, U.N. ESCOR, 43d Sess., Supp. 5, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/L.4

(1987).
128. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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When the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
being prepared by the Commission on Human Rights, earlier drafts
of what now is article 4 of that Covenant provided that derogations
from the obligations of States Parties should be admissible "in time
of war or other public emergency" or "in time of war or other
public emergency threatening the interests of the people." In the
course of the proceedings in the Commission on Human Rights it
was recognized that one of the most important public emergencies
was the outbreak of war. It was felt, however, that the Covenant
should not envisage, even by implication, the possibility of war.29
The fact that participating States found a need to provide a possibility of
partial derogation in wartime indicates that they viewed human rights
covenants as being applicable during wartime.
A second indication in the text of the Covenant that it applies to
belligerent occupation is its article specifying the scope of the Covenant's applicability. Article 2 requires a State Party to ensure rights "to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction."' 30 This
formulation would seem to cover territory over which a State Party
exercises jurisdiction, such as territory Under belligerent occupation.
Clearly the formulation covers the territory. of a State Party, in the sense
of territory over which it exercises sovereignty. The drafters added the
phrase "subject to its jurisdiction." The matter might have been clearer
had they used "or" rather than "and" preceding "subject to its jurisdiction." However, the latter phrase has little meaning unless it applies to
protect persons located other than in sovereign-held territory.
This construction of the Covenant is reinforced by the case law
under the European human rights treaty, which similarly applies to
persons under the jurisdiction of a State. The European treaty states in
its provision on applicability: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
Section 1 of this Convention."'' 3
The European Commission of Human Rights has ruled that the
European treaty applies to territory under belligerent occupation. That

129. Secretary-General Report 1969, supra note 121, at 13 (citations omitted). For text

of the drafts using the phrase "in time of war or other public emergency," see MARC J.
BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PR9PARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 81-82 (1987); see also id. at 86 (containing Human Rights

Commission explanation confirming the Secretary-General's analysis of the reason for
omission of a reference to war).
130. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
131. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 56, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
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holding arose from Turkey's occupation in 1974 of northern Cyprus.
Cyprus filed a complaint against Turkey, alleging human rights violations. Turkey denied that it was in belligerent occupation on the ground
that a new government had been established in northern Cyprus and that
Turkey did not exercise control there. The European Commission found,
however, that Turkey did control northern Cyprus as a belligerent occupant, because Turkish forces had "entered the island of Cyprus, operating solely under the direction of the Turkish Government and under
established rules governing the structure and command of these armed
forces including the establishment of military courts."' 132 The Commission said that the phrase "within their jurisdiction" in the European
treaty meant "that the High Contracting Parties are bound to secure the
said rights and freedoms to all persons under their actual authority and
responsibility, not only when that authority is exercised within their own
territory but also when it is exercised abroad."' 133 Thus, the European
treaty applied to belligerent occupation.
Like the European treaty, the Covenant would seem to cover belligerent occupation. Despite Israel's position on the matter, the Covenant
applies to Israel's actions in the occupied territories. Thus, the international community is likely to continue to hold Israel accountable on the
basis of the Covenant.
IV. APPLICABILITY IN ISRAELI COURTS
A related question is whether the Israeli courts will apply the Covenant as domestic law, relating either to cases arising in Israel or to
cases arising in the occupied territories. Israel follows the British rule on
treaties as domestic law, namely, that a treaty does not enter into domestic law absent legislation relating to the particular treaty that would
transform it into local law. 134 To date, Israel's Knesset has not enacted
such legislation.
If this situation persists, a litigant will be unable to base an action
on the Covenant as she or he might do on a piece of domestic legislation. However, in other States that also follow the British practice, the
Covenant has been used to construe related rights found in domestic law
without enacting domestic legislation.

132. Cyprus v. Turkey, 62 I.L.R. 75 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1982) (decision on admissibility).

133. Id. at 74.
134. Mazen Qupty, The Application of InternationalLaw in the Occupied Territoriesas
Reflected in the Judgments of the High Court of Justice in Israel, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: Two DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP 87, 105-06 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
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In the United Kingdom, although the Covenant has not been trans-

formed by parliament into domestic law, 35 lawyers invoked the Covenant in a case involving freedom of expression. The court used the
Covenant in determining the content of freedom of expression as found
in British domestic law.' 36 In Australia, which, like Britain, does not
deem treaties to be domestic law, the Covenant was used by a court in

determining the content of the right against racial discrimination.

37

In

Canada, the Ontario High Court used the Covenant's provision on the
right to be informed of a criminal charge 38 to construe the Canadian
charter provision on a similar right. 39 The Israeli courts could be expected to follow this practice, even if they do not hold the Covenant to
be directly applicable as domestic law.

Regarding application in the occupied territories, the courts would
face the additional issue of whether human rights law should be followed there. In at least one case involving rights in the occupied territories, the Supreme Court of Israel looked to international practice in
determining the content of the right under dispute. The case involved
freedom of association. After a group of lawyers organized a lawyers'
union in the West Bank, Israel's military governor issued an order

retaining for himself the right to appoint the members of the union's
executive committee and prohibiting any independent financing of the
union."4 On a challenge of that order, the Supreme Court of Israel said
that under humanitarian law, Israel was required to preserve the

135. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspaper Ltd., [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28, 60 (Eng.
C.A.) (opinion of Butler-Sloss, L.J.). In the United Kingdom, which has no rule comparable
to Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution that would make treaties the "law of the land," a treaty
does not become domestic law unless explicitly transformed into domestic law by an act of
parliament.
136. Id. at 60 (opinion of Butler-Sloss, L.J., that the Covenant applies in determining the
scope of free speech in the United Kingdom, even though the Covenant has not been incorporated into domestic law by parliament).
137. Mabo v. Queensland, 175 C.L.R. 1, 42 (Austl. 1992) (Brennan, J.) (stating, in the
course of an opinion holding for the first time that the Australian common law recognizes
traditional land titles of Australia's indigenous inhabitants, that Covenant provisions prohibiting discrimination are relevant in determining the content of the Australian common law on
that question).
138. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 14(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
139. Re Warren, 35 Crim. Rep. 3d 173, 177 (1983) (Can.). See also Walter S. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Experience with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Seen from the Perspective of a Former Member of the Human Rights Committee, 20
AKRON L. REV. 611, 627 (1987).
140. Bahij Tamimi et al., v. Minister of Defence et al. (Case of Arab Lawyers Union),
High Court of Justice of Israel, No. 507/85, Ruling of Sept. 16, 1987, (Goldberg, J., with
Alon and Halima, JJ., concurring), 41(4) Piskei Din 57 (1987), summarized in 18 ISRAEL Y.B.
ON HuM. RTs. 248 (1988); Khalil Touma, Working vs. Striking Lawyers and the Right to
Form a Union, AL-FAJR, Oct. 18, 1987, at 8.
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"community life" of the occupied territory,' 4' and that in determining
what constitutes "community life" it must apply the standards of a late
twentieth-century democratic State. 142 Finding that the right of
association for professional groups is recognized in such a hypothetical
State, the court ruled that the lawyers had a right to elect their own
executive committee and to fund their union independently."' The court
did not refer to the Covenant or to human rights norms, but in assessing
what is normal in a "late twentieth century democratic State," one can
hardly avoid norms set in such treaties as the Covenant.
CONCLUSION

If Israel's declaration of an emergency is invalid, then it will be
held responsible for detention that goes beyond the requirements of
article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Since Israel has not ratified the Covenant's Optional Protocol, the matter
cannot be taken to the Human Rights Committee on. an individual
complaint. The issue will arise, however, before the Committee in the
context of periodic reports by Israel to the Committee about its compliance with the Covenant.
Israel has not complied with the requirements of article 4, because it
has not explained with specificity the reasons for its derogation. Israel's
assertion in its declaration concerning armed attacks lacks factual
grounds such as dates and attackers. Its assertion about terrorism is so
ill-defined that, without more detail, it is insufficient as the basis for a
state of emergency. Moreover, even if Israel were to provide detail, it is
not clear that it would be able to establish a sufficient factual basis,
either regarding armed attacks or regarding terrorism, to derogate completely from the human rights protection proffered in article 9 of the
Covenant.

141. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
annex, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306; 1 CHARLES BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 631 (1968). The
only official text of the Hague Regulations was in French, and in art. 43 the term used was
"'ordre et la vie publics." Judge Goldberg rendered "vie public" as "community life." The
phrase "l'ordre et la vie publics" is incorrectly rendered in the English translation in 36 Stat.
2277 as "public order and safety." See also opinion. of Ben-Porat, J., taking art. 43 in its

incorrect English translation. Abd al Nasser el Aziz al Affu v. Commander of I.D.F. Forces
in the West Bank, 42(2) Piskei Din 4 (1988), summarized in 24 ISRAEL L. REV. 137 (1990).
142. Bahij Tamimi et al., High Court of Justice of Israel, No. 507/85, Ruling of Sept. 16,
1987, 41(4) Piskei Din 57 (1987) 2.
143. Id. I 6, 10.

